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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Part One – Efficiency of the ACE Market 
1. The ACE market appears to meet the standard conditions for efficient markets. 
2. Several information sources exist for the New Zealand Annual Catch Entitlements (ACE) market making 
information easily accessible. 
3. Small fishers are reliant on Licensed Fish Receivers (LFRs) for both ACE information and access to ACE, and 
are concerned that excessive market power exists in the ACE market – small fishers are at a competitive 
disadvantage. 
4. Larger fishers search for ACE information data more frequently than small fishers and rely on 
commercially supplied information via FishServe and direct fisher contacts. 
5. ACE market participants utilise networks, including quota brokers and LFR–fisher relationships in ACE 
sourcing and trading.  
 
Part Two – Arbitrage in the NZ ACE Market: Deemed Value Mitigation 
1. Trade in ACE between overfished fishers for reducing deemed value liability exists in the New Zealand 
ACE market. 
2. Over the seven year period 2005 to 2012 ACE arbitrage trading resulted in savings in deemed value 
obligations of $1.766 million. 
3. The number of fishstocks where arbitrage trading occurs is a small percentage of total fishstocks; in 2012 
only seven fishstocks had deemed value savings, through arbitrage, of more than $1000. 
4. The general trend in arbitrage trading for 2005 to 2012 is downward – the notable exception being Ling 7. 
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PART ONE – EFFICIENCY OF THE ACE MARKET 
 
Objectives of Part One  
Balancing actual catch with Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE) is crucial to the efficient operation of the New 
Zealand Quota Management System (QMS). ACE market efficiency is dependent on the existence of ACE 
prices that reflect all available information and that are readily accessible by all market participants.  
Part 1 of this study analyses the information channels for ACE availability and how accessing information 
differs between large and small fishers, both overall and in the SNA1 fishery. The views of fishers, fish 
processors, and quota brokers on the operation of the ACE market have been captured by means of an ACE 
market survey and through extensive consultation with industry participants.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Under the New Zealand Quota Management System (QMS) annual catch entitlements (ACE) are allocated 
based on privately owned quota share holdings of fishstocks. A fisher who owns quota shares receives an 
allocation of ACE. This may meet their entire annual ACE requirements, or they may need to acquire 
additional ACE, or conversely, dispose of excess ACE. It is also common for fishers to not own any quota 
shares and so they need to acquire their entire ACE requirement in the ACE market.  
 
Participation in the quota share and ACE markets includes persons with a variety of motivations. Retired 
fishers and investors who own quota shares but do not fish simply sell their ACE. Licensed Fish Receivers 
(LFRs) may own quota shares and thereby receive ACE, and may seek to acquire additional ACE to facilitate 
trade with the fishers who supply them. Quota brokers participate in buying and selling ACE to and from 
LFRs and fishers, and may also own quota shares and receive their own ACE allocations.  
Balancing of catch with ACE is a necessary requirement of the QMS. Fishers who find themselves overfished 
for a species are potentially liable for penalty payments through the deemed value system on the amount 
overfished. Fishers in an overfished position will thus seek to buy sufficient ACE to balance against their total 
annual catch. The process of balancing catch against ACE is on-going throughout the fishing year but 
becomes critical at year-end when, if the fisher remains unable to source sufficient ACE, final deemed value 
liabilities become binding. 
Sourcing ACE in a timely, cost effective manner relies on the availability of clear information channels in the 
ACE market. Holders of excess ACE require price signals to determine optimal sell strategy and, similarly, 
potential buyers require clear information on the availability and price of ACE.  
The purpose of this study is to identify and evaluate the adequacy of the available sources of ACE 
information for independent (typically small) fishers and larger companies. The role of fish receivers in 
providing ACE to fishers who supply them is also considered. Fish receivers include fish processors and are 
referred to in this report as Licensed Fish Receivers or LFRs. An important fishery – snapper 1 (SNA1) – is 
examined separately as a case study. 
The SNA1 fishery is further investigated in Part 2 of this report which measures the extent to which 
overfished fishers engage in arbitrage1 as a way of lessening deemed value charges incurred when they are 
unable to balance catch against ACE. 
                                                                
1 Arbitrage is the practice of making a financial gain by exploiting an imbalance in a commodity’s price in a market, or between 
markets. An ACE price imbalance is generated through the impact on individual fishers of the deemed value payment system. In the 
ACE market, an arbitrage transaction is said to occur when one fisher, whose annual catch exceeds their ACE (i.e. the fisher is 
overfished) buys ACE from a second less overfished fisher. The more overfished a fisher the higher the marginal deemed value levy 
becomes. The progressivity in the deemed value rate structure occurs in 20 percentile bands, meaning that overfished fishers may be 
able to reduce a deemed value liability at the higher rate by buying ACE from a less overfished fisher, without the less overfished fisher 
moving to the a higher deemed value rate. 
For example, consider two fishers with equal ACE in the SNA1 fishstock at the opening of the fishing year. Suppose that Fisher A ends 
the year 105% overfished and Fisher B ends being only 5% overfished. Fisher A is liable to pay a deemed value rate of $26 per 
kilogramme on the top 5% of their 105% overfishing, whereas Fisher B is liable to pay a deemed value rate of $13 per kilogramme on 
the their 5% overfishing. If Fisher A buys ACE equal to the 5 % overcatch from Fisher B then Fisher A would save $26 per kilogramme 
(and move to being 100% overfished) whereas Fisher B would continue to pay $13 per kilogramme on the additional 5% (and move to 
being 10% overfished). The $13 per kilogramme saving by Fisher A is the gain from the arbitrage transaction. It is shared, by 
negotiation, through the price paid for the ACE bought. The deemed value savings are used, in part, to induce the less overfished fisher 
to sell ACE to the more overfished fisher. 
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2 METHODOLOGY 
 
The investigation of the ACE market began with consultations with a wide range of ACE market participants. 
These included fishers (ranging from small scale to large companies), shore managers, quota brokers, 
licenced fish receivers, the fisheries data management and industry service provider FishServe, ACE market 
arbitrageurs, and analysts from the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI). Fruitful discussions were also held 
with various industry stakeholders at the 2013 conference of the New Zealand Federation of Commercial 
Fishermen (NZFCF). 
Following the preliminary consultation phase a questionnaire was widely distributed – available online and 
in print format – through industry contacts and to the delegates attending the NZFCF conference. The online 
link to the survey was also advertised on the home page of the FishServe website. This website is visited 
regularly by fishers and others involved with the QMS fishery. For the SNA1 case study the survey was sent 
by email notification to the majority of ACE holders in this fishery.  
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3 THE OVERALL ACE MARKET 
 
The survey yielded 114 responses with 41 of these related specifically to SNA1.The overall findings of the 
questionnaire sent to all ACE market participants in the QMS fishery are set out in this section and the SNA1 
findings are set out in Section 4. 
 
3.1 ACE MARKET PARTICIPATION: NATURE OF INVOLVEMENT 
 
Respondents were asked to identify how they were involved in the ACE market, and to indicate their main 
involvement. Figure 3.1 shows that for most respondents the main involvement in the ACE market was as a 
fisher. 
  
 
FIGURE 3.1 TYPE OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE ACE MARKET (MAIN INVOLVEMENT) 
 
For the other categories of involvement the Quota Holder category represents participants whose main 
involvement is the selling of ACE, based on their quota share. A number of respondents reported dual, or 
multiple involvements, with 30 per cent involved as fisher and quota holders, 4.7 per cent involved as fisher, 
processor, quota holder and quota broker, and 11.6 per cent involved as fisher, processor and quota holder. 
Thirty-seven per cent reported that they were exclusively fishers (see Figure 3.2). 
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FIGURE 3.2  TYPE OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE ACE MARKET (COMBINATIONS) 
 
Figure 3.3 shows that the great majority of participants have been involved in the ACE market for a 
considerable time. Time in the industry is likely associated with the establishment of reliable information 
channels and suggests that long stayers have built effective ACE trading relationships with other industry 
participants. New entrants (those having been in the industry 3 years or less) would be expected to report 
greater difficulty in sourcing information on ACE, and in acquiring ACE. The small number of new entrants in 
the fishery is likely indicative of these difficulties. 
 
 
FIGURE 3.3  YEARS OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE ACE MARKET 
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The number of employees was used as an indicator of size and produced results showing that a broad cross 
section of industry participants responded to the survey, including two large entities having over 1000 
employees along with many smaller operators. This range in scale of operation was also reflected in the 
results for questions about sales turnover and vessel size. 
The survey was also used to establish each participant’s four main ACE fishstocks for revenue generation. 
The results show a wide range of species are targeted, with key high value species such as snapper, grey 
mullet 1, flatfish 1 and gurnard 1 featuring frequently. 
3.2 ACE MARKET INFORMATION CHANNELS 
 
Figure 3.4 reports on the participant’s propensity to buy and sell ACE. Most respondents are mainly buyers 
but many are active as both buyers and sellers. A number of participants appear not to be active as buyers 
or sellers of ACE – these are likely to be fishers who own quota shares and catch only their own ACE. 
 
 
FIGURE 3.4 ACE INVOLVEMENT 
 
Figure 3.5 shows that a variety of ACE market information channels is available to ACE market participants. 
The primary channel used by a participant is related to the nature of their involvement in the ACE market. 
Fishers generally have close relationships with LFRs (identified also as processors) and quota brokers. Quota 
brokers and larger entities are more likely to source ACE information from FishServe FRED – an online search 
tool giving up-to-date reports on ACE and quota holdings reports2. This pattern of behaviour is related to the 
time participants devote to searching for ACE.  Quota brokers devote greater resources to search activity in 
order to service their ACE buyers. The cost to subscribe to FRED deters some small fishers while smaller 
                                                                
2 FRED is an online tool that allows users to run and customise their own set of reports using live up-to-date-data from the Quota Share 
and ACE Registers via the internet. It gives access to ACE Holdings, ACE Transfer Prices, Catch vs. ACE Comparison, Catch by Month 
Comparison, Deemed Value Rates, Quota Holdings, and Quota Transfer Prices. Such information helps identify potential sources of ACE. 
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fishers are also unlikely to have the extensive networks that brokers and large vertically integrated 
operators have developed. 
  
FIGURE 3.5  INFORMATION AVAILABILITY 
 
 
FIGURE 3.6  INFORMATION SEARCH FREQUENCY 
 
Figure 3.6 suggests that information channels for the ACE market are actively used. This is evident from the 
frequency with which some ACE market participants seek updated information; 8 per cent doing so daily and 
a further 17 per cent seeking information on a weekly basis. Information search activity by the small fisher 
was somewhat less frequent; this discussed further below. 
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3.3 CHANNELS USED FOR SOURCING ACE 
 
ACE market information search channels, such as FishServe’s FRED, give indications of who may have 
uncaught ACE in a fishstock but it is not a direct source of ACE. 
Figure 3.7 reports the main sources for acquiring ACE for a fishstock. As anticipated, LFRs are a key source of 
ACE. The reliance of small fishers, on a LFR for ACE was evident from discussions held with industry contacts 
and from survey results. 
 
  
FIGURE 3.7  MAIN SOURCE OF ACE AVAILABILITY 
 
The market for ACE for individual fishstocks varies greatly in terms of demand versus supply positions. 
Fishstocks underfished by a fisher are often in excess supply, and/or have a low ACE price. This may be 
driven by the low demand in the market for the fish caught or by difficulties associated with obtaining ACE 
for a bycatch stock. It is also possible that the total allowable commercial catch (TACC) exceeds what fishers 
are actually able to catch in the fishing year. Figure 3.8 shows that about one third of market participants 
had specific fishstock-related ACE for which there was no buyer, this is in line with an ACE market 
experiencing excess ACE supply over ACE demand. Anecdotally, some fishers remain underfished in a 
fishstock as a result of the unavailability of ACE in a key bycatch stock, forcing them to stop fishing 
altogether for the season.  
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FIGURE 3.8  REASONS FOR NOT SELLING ACE IF UNDERFISHED BY MORE THAN 10% 
 
3.4 ACE MARKET TRANSACTION COSTS 
 
A key characteristic of an efficient market is low transaction costs. ACE market participants were asked to 
comment on whether transactions were costly to perform, and what the main transaction cost was. The 
great majority indicated that transaction costs were not costly to perform (see Figure 3.9) with only 20 per 
cent indicating that transaction costs were a problem. Of those who considered transaction costs to be a 
problem, the majority (65%) considered financial costs to be the main cause of transaction cost (see Figure 
3.10). 
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It is noteworthy that time spent conducting trades is not a factor; indicating that ACE markets are efficient 
at providing market information, such as price and availability. This is in keeping with the existence of a 
sophisticated market; having many buyers and sellers, clear price signals and low levels of information 
asymmetry. 
 
FIGURE 3.10  NATURE OF ACE MARKET TRANSACTION COST 
 
3.5 ACE MARKET COMPARISONS: THE SMALL FISHER AND THE NEW ENTRANT  
 
The overall findings suggest that the ACE market channels utilised by small entities differ somewhat from 
large fishing entities. Small fishers are mostly buyers of ACE. They have multiple search channels for ACE 
market information but rely mostly on the LFR and quota broker. In contrast large fishers rely heavily on 
FishServe’s FRED and direct contacts with other fishers.  
The source of ACE market information has been distinguished from the source of ACE. The distinction 
highlights that although the small fisher seeks information from quota brokers, the main source of ACE is the 
LFR. This suggests that LFRs play the key role in providing small fishers with ACE, while quota brokers are a 
secondary source of additional ACE. The frequency of information search by small fisher participants 
indicated somewhat less frequent search activity, with no small fisher searching on a daily basis. 
New entrants to an industry must generally overcome barriers to entry – the absence of barriers being a 
condition of only perfectly competitive markets.  Easy (preferably costless) access to information on ACE 
price would remove one potential barrier to a new fisher’s entry. The findings indicate that new entrant 
fishers are more likely to depend on the LFR for information on ACE and for acquiring ACE cover, suggesting 
that the LFR plays an important role in supporting and facilitating the entry of fishers to the industry. 
In summary, respondents to the survey have indicated that multiple sources exist for ACE market 
information. Small fishers and new entrants appear to have greater dependency on a LFR for both ACE 
information and actual ACE than larger fishers. This is explained by market structure in the fishing industry – 
larger fishers operate as vertically integrated firms, catching and processing their own fish, as well receiving 
fish from other fishers.  In general, ACE market transactions are not considered to be costly to perform, 
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making the transfer of ACE between fishers relatively easy to perform, and thus contributing to market 
efficiency. The following section examines the operation of the ACE market for the snapper 1 fishery. 
4 ACE MARKET SURVEY RESULTS FOR SNAPPER 1 (SNA1) 
 
The preceding discussion looked at the overall fishery – this section concentrates on the ACE market for a 
single fishery. The Snapper 1 (SNA1) fishery is important as a revenue generator, and is a fishery 
characterised by a relatively large number of participants, many of whom reported difficulty accessing SNA1 
ACE to achieve catch balancing, either when SNA is the target or when it is a bycatch to another target 
species. The survey attracted 41 responses from ACE holders in SNA1. 
 
4.1  SNA1 ACE MARKET: NATURE OF INVOLVEMENT 
The survey responses indicate that a higher number of SNA1 ACE market participants are in the quota 
holder category compared to the overall quota market (25% versus 6%) (see Figure 4.1). An explanation for 
this could be the strong demand for SNA1 ACE and consequent  high ACE price for SNA1 – making this 
fishstock a desirable long term investment for retired fishers or others who have acquired a holding of SNA1 
quota shares. It is also noteworthy that only one quarter of SNA1 fishers have quota share holdings – a 
result marginally below that for the overall fishery – making it necessary for the majority of SNA1 fishers to 
regularly find ACE through the market to balance their catch (see Figure 4.2).  
 
FIGURE 4.1  TYPE OF INVOLVEMENT (SNA1) 
 
29.3
4.9 4.9
24.4
2.4
22.0
2.4
7.3
2.4
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Fisher Processor Broker Quota
Holder
Fisher,
Processor,
Broker &
Quota
Holder
Fisher &
Quota
Holder
Fisher,
Processor &
Quota
Holder
Processor &
Quota
Holder
Fisher &
Processor
P
er
ce
n
t
15 
  
 
FIGURE 4.2  MAIN INVOLVEMENT (SNA1) 
 
Consistent with the picture for the overall ACE survey, the great majority (85%) of SNA1 ACE market 
participants have been in the industry for 10 years or longer. The small proportion of new entrants results 
from the constant TACC setting for SNA1, and consequent high price for SNA1 ACE, making entry to the 
fishery difficult (a pattern also seen in the industry overall). 
The SNA1 fishery has a range of firm sizes co-existing in the fishery, suggesting that economies of scale in 
this fishery are not substantial. This is also borne out by the existence of a relatively high number of smaller 
vessels operating in this fishery.  
The results to the question asking fishers to list their ‘most important fish stock for revenue’ feature the top 
retail species: snapper, terakihi and gurnard. Of these it is the cost and availability of SNA1 ACE that fishers 
report being their principal difficulty. This result also indicates that snapper is either the target species or a 
key bycatch species for practically all fishers in the SNA1 sample. 
 
4.2 SNA1 ACE MARKET INFORMATION CHANNELS 
 
Information search activity on ACE availability in SNA1 exhibits a pattern similar to that found in the overall 
fishery study. The exception is that a greater number of respondents in SNA1 reported that they seldom 
(10%) or never (18%) search for information on ACE availability. 
The channels of ACE market information for SNA1 and the frequency with which they are accessed is 
consistent with the results for the overall fishery; quota brokers and LFRs are key sources of ACE 
information. Fisher contacts are more important as a source of ACE market information for the SNA1 
respondents compared to the overall fishery, possibly the result of the existence of the proximity of local 
fisher networks. 
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The LFR is the principal source of ACE, with fisher contacts and quota brokers playing an important 
subsidiary role; a pattern that was also observed in the overall fishery survey.  
Low transaction costs are an important characteristic of efficient markets. The respondents for the SNA1 
fishery are in agreement with those for the overall fishery (68% versus 57%) that ACE transactions are not 
costly to perform and for those that considered transactions costly financial costs were considered to be the 
main cost (50% versus 65%).   
This result is an indication that information channels in the SNA1, and overall fishery, are effective at 
providing information to ACE market participants. There was no indication of information asymmetries; both 
parties to the market transaction having ready access to the same information. This is a strong indication 
that ACE prices reflect all available market information, both for actual data, such as overall catch versus 
total ACE, and expected end-of-year outcomes – this is another important characteristic of an efficient 
market. 
 
 
5 ACE MARKET ISSUES: THE BYCATCH PROBLEM 
 
ACE market participants were asked to comment on the main issues they had with the operation of the ACE 
market, and how they could see these being resolved. The comments have been presented in Appendix A. 
They are grouped according to the respondent’s main involvement in the fishery, thereby allowing the 
reader to identify the differing perspectives of fishers, LFRs and quota brokers. The comments from the 
SNA1 fishery have been shown under a separate heading. 
Fishers commented on the difficulty of harvesting their target fishstocks without encountering high levels of 
bycatch of species for which no ACE was available.  
The suggestions for correcting this ranged from simply increasing TACC for key bycatch stocks to amending 
the deemed value system so as to make the surrender of excess bycatch cost neutral to the fisher 
The bycatch issue exists for virtually all finfish fishers operating in the inshore fishery. All report having at 
least four species that contribute significantly to their revenue. This fact helps to explain why fishers are 
concerned about the difficulty of acquiring ACE for their bycatch species. Despite various bycatch mitigation 
strategies, some fishers report being confronted with no other option but the in-season cessation of fishing. 
The difficulty in acquiring ACE for bycatch is likely to impact more heavily on the small fisher. Their smaller 
levels of ACE and narrower portfolio of stocks requires a more finely tuned catch-plan to balance catch with 
ACE across all species. Failure to balance catch with the ACE held prompts urgent ACE search activity, 
typically through LFRs and quota brokers, but this is often a fruitless pursuit. LFR’s and quota brokers – 
operating in the same hotly contested market – face the same fixed ACE supply constraint so are often 
unable to assist. Without the ACE for bycatch, fishers are likely to remain underfished in their target species 
– an obvious cause of frustration for fishers who are unable to complete the catch of their ACE holding 
despite a strong market demand for the fish. They may also find it difficult to sell their surplus ACE as other 
fishers find themselves in the same situation. 
The extent to which a fisher is overfished in a fishstock may be related to the deemed value rate applied to 
that fishstock. In some cases the deemed value rate is low enough to allow the fisher to overfish and still 
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make a net return on the fish landed, in other cases (such as SNA1) this is clearly not the case. The great 
majority of fishers overfished in SNA1 are overfished in a number of other fishstocks. In some cases the level 
of overcatch is immaterial in terms of financial impact but in a number of instances this is not the case. It 
appears, prima facie, that over-catching is not always the result of the incidental overcatch of a bycatch; 
there appear to be cases where fishers catch in excess of ACE across a wide and diverse range of fishstocks. 
These findings would benefit from deeper investigation. 
ACE markets for certain stocks have a large number of competing entities, some possessing considerable 
market power on both the demand and supply side of the ACE market. The shortage of ACE availability in 
the open market results in the emergence of preferred LFR-fisher relationships as a means of ensuring some 
continuity of ACE from season to season. But even with these, there is no guarantee that a fisher or LFR will 
be able to secure sufficient ACE given such a tight market. Market power on the demand side has also been 
reported by industry participants, in particular the ability of large entities to out-bid smaller entities when 
tendering for ACE (and quota shares) offered for sale. 
Deemed value rates vary considerably across fishstocks, making the penalty for over-catching significantly 
more severe in some stocks – SNA1 in particular has sharply progressive deemed value rates which 
ultimately result in penalties many times greater than the landed value of the fish.    
The current deemed value schedule for such stocks places fishers at risk of severe financial penalty if a 
substantial over-catch were to occur. This is clearly a cause for considerable anxiety amongst fishers. 
Additionally, fishers express great difficulty in successfully competing for ACE in key target and bycatch 
fishstocks (for example snapper), due to general unavailability and to ACE price being above a commercial 
viable or breakeven point.  
In a final note on the efficiency of the ACE market, the practice of ACE (and quota share) bundling was raised 
by respondents, whereby entities offer a mix, or parcel, of fishstocks for sale as one lot. Such parcels may be 
relatively large, with a commensurately large parcel price, meaning that it would be unlikely for a small 
fisher to have the necessary funds to participate in the tender – even if the excess ACE was to be on-sold. 
This indicates that the ACE market has elements of a ‘seller’s market’ where non-standardised ‘goods’ are 
able to be sold because of the absence of competition.  
Enquires with industry sources indicate that Iwi Collective Partnerships (ICP) find it convenient to parcel 
individual holdings of ACE and go to the market as one lot – thereby making very sizeable parcels of ACE. 
This is also an option used by private quota holders seeking a return on ACE. In addition to the tendency for 
such parcels to be large, they are also likely to include fishstocks that the buyer is unable to harvest – and 
may include some uneconomic fishstocks. Bidders would need to have arrangements to deal with this; 
specialist deepwater operators would have arrangements to place the inshore portion of a parcel with a 
third party inshore fisher – perhaps having the tender figures prepared by the inshore operator, even 
though the tender was on the overall package. Similar arrangements would be made for ACE in niche 
fisheries such as CRA, PAU, and SUR. The inclusion in the package of fishstocks that have little or no value is 
common practice followed by the vendor entities. Buyers generally place a nil figure against such stocks 
when determining their overall bid price. It is normal practice for such ACE bundles to be offered for sale by 
tender at the beginning of the fishing year and often involve rollover facilities for on-going relationships but 
with an opportunity for annual price adjustment. The practice of ACE bundling has advantages for vendors 
wishing to reduce transaction costs and would have similar benefits for large fishers but clearly does not suit 
the small fisher. 
Survey respondents were also asked to give their views on how the ACE mechanism could be improved. 
Suggestions were generally interventionist, such as the formation of a two-tier ACE market, whereby a 
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proportion of ACE would be set aside for tender amongst small fishers only. The assumption here being that 
ACE would become more available and affordable – an outcome that would only occur if overall small fisher 
capacity was in balance with ACE. 
However, despite the existing market power of dominant firms, from an economic perspective any 
redistribution should be justified on efficiency grounds, such as sustainability of fishstocks. Distribution of 
quota on grounds of equity, or the preservation of a way-of-life, does not align well with strict market 
performance measures. However, small fishers use smaller vessels and gear types and catch methods 
generally differ from large fishing operations. These variations may sustain an efficiency-based argument for 
their continued existence in the inshore fishery, and thus improved access to ACE in key fishstocks but such 
an argument has not yet been convincingly developed 
6 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
This study has demonstrated that the ACE market is efficient at providing ACE price and availability 
information across a range of entity types participating in the ACE market. Small fishers, larger vertically 
integrated entities, quota brokers, and quota holders appear to form, and have access to, extensive 
information networks within the ACE market. These networks, supported by the data management hub 
FishServe, make ACE market information readily available and at low time and financial cost. 
Accessing ACE for purchase is more problematic for many participants. Small fishers rely heavily on 
relationships with LFRs and quota brokers. Market imperfections in the ACE market are reported, 
particularly in the control over ACE availability by way of LFR-fisher networks.  An insider-outsider 
dichotomy prevails where fishers with close ties to large LFRs are supported with ACE, in preference to 
those without ties (independents).  Bidding for any ACE available in the ‘open market’ for key fishstocks is 
highly competitive, and smaller fishers with shorter payback periods, are generally unsuccessful. Parcelling 
fishstocks into a mixed package for tender also disadvantages the small fisher. A large proportion of ACE in 
many fishstocks never enters the ACE market at all as the quota owner fishes the ACE derived from their 
quota share. 
The bycatch problem is ubiquitous and especially problematic for the small fisher. The unavailability of ACE 
for overfished fishstocks places the fisher in danger of financial ruin due to the penalties incurred through 
deemed value obligations. Cessation of fishing for the remainder of a fishing-year, even with underfished 
ACE in the target species, may become the only prudent option. Simplistic solutions, such as increasing 
TACC, will not resolve the core issue of excess capacity and consequent excess demand for a fixed resource 
– the ACE. Small fishers without their own quota share, and the resulting ACE, need strong alliances within 
the industry (such as a LFR with ACE) to furnish them with ACE to balance against catch. Without such 
alliances they are unlikely to survive. 
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PART TWO – ARBITRAGE IN THE NZ ACE MARKET: DEEMED VALUE 
MITIGATION 
 
Objective of Part 2 
 
The objective of part 2 of this study is to measure value of ACE market arbitrage transactions in the New 
Zealand quota managed fishery and to examine the relationship between deemed value rates and ACE 
prices for arbitrage-related fishstocks. Arbitrage in this study is defined as ACE trading between two fishers 
who are both overfished at the completion of the trade. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
 
New Zealand’s diverse multi-species fishery is managed through a comprehensive Quota Management 
System (QMS) covering around 100 species. The species are subsequently divided by Quota Management 
Area (QMA) to end up with over 500 individual fishstocks. Each fishstock has a scientifically determined 
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) from which a Total Allowable Commercial Catch (TACC) is determined. At its 
inception the QMS allocated Quota Shares to fishers based on their previous catch history. Each Quota 
Share represents a one-one hundred millionth share of the TACC. Dividing the TACC by 100,000,000 gives 
the Quota Weight Equivalent (QWE) for one share and then enables each quota holder to be allocated their 
Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE). 
Each fisher is obliged, under the rules of the QMS, to match the catch for each fishstock with ACE for that 
fishstock. In a multispecies fishery, such as much of New Zealand’s inshore fishery, a fisher will require a 
portfolio of ACE, for even when targeting a specific species, bycatch is practically unavoidable. At times, 
even with a portfolio of ACE and a carefully determined catch plan, a fisher will be overfished in a fishstock 
(or even several fishstocks). It then becomes necessary to look to the ACE market to acquire the ACE to 
cover the excess catch. If the fishstock is overfished in total by the industry – total commercial catch 
exceeding total ACE – then the fisher will be unlikely to find ACE available for sale and will therefore remain 
overfished. This is when the deemed value mechanism impacts on the overfished fisher. 
The deemed value mechanism was introduced to provide fishers with a legal means of landing overfished 
fish while at the same time imposing strong disincentives to overcatch. It recognises the reality that catch 
versus ACE balancing will not always be achieved and allows a way for fishers to avoid the dilemma of 
discarding (and potential prosecution) versus landing overcatch (and – prior to the deemed value system – 
certain prosecution). Today, a fisher landing catch in excess of ACE will pay a deemed value rate per 
kilogram of fish overfished. This rate increases in thresholds as the percentage overfished increases and is 
set as a proportion of the port price for the particular fishstock. In some cases, the deemed value rate ends 
up being several times higher than what a fisher would receive for the fish landed: Deemed value rates can 
range from being tolerably low to being an ‘avoid at all costs’ penalty threatening a fishers commercial 
continuance. 
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Fishers effectively have a full year to balance their annual catch against ACE. If by end-of-year they remain 
overfished (unable to access full ACE cover) the deemed value penalties (financial in nature) become 
binding. Given that deemed value rates increase progressively as the percentage overfished rises, a fisher’s 
incentive to find ACE cover increases in line with the level of overfishing. One unexpected option is to seek 
ACE from fishers who are also overfished, but at a lower percentage amount and consequentially a lower 
deemed value rate. In this situation a financial benefit from a form of arbitrage becomes possible. 
The potential for a financial gain exists for the overfished ACE buyer in the form of a reduction in the 
amount of deemed value owing, and to the ACE seller based on a share of the financial relief achieved by 
the buyer. It is this activity that this report seeks to measure and describe, over the study period: 2006 to 
2012.  
It is important to note that this activity (which is referred to as arbitrage) is not in breach of fisheries 
regulations – it complies with rules for ACE transferal. It does however result in reducing the deemed value 
penalty from overfishing, and so reduces the disincentive, associated with failure to balance catch against 
ACE.   
 
2 METHODOLOGY 
Deemed value rates increase progressively, usually in twenty percentile bands to a maximum rate is reached 
when a fisher is more than 100 per cent overfished. Thus the fisher’s incentive for accessing ACE increases in 
line with the level of overfishing. In a number of fishstocks the TACC is fully, or overfished (catch exceeding 
total ACE) by the end of the fishing year and unfished ACE is generally unavailable, making deemed value 
liabilities of overfished fishers unavoidable. Arbitrage may however offer an opportunity to mitigate these 
deemed value obligations. 
By buying ACE from fishers who are less overfished, and therefore face a lower deemed value rate, a more 
highly overfished fisher can cover some, or perhaps all, of their over-catch at the higher deemed value rate. 
The saving in deemed value is shared by way of payment for ACE to the less overfished fisher. For example, 
in Snapper 1 a fisher who is 5 per cent overfished pays a deemed value rate of $13.00 per kilogramme (kg) 
whereas a fisher more than 100 per cent overfished pays deemed value at a rate of $26.00 per kg. The more 
overfished fisher saves $26 per kg on each kilo of ACE bought from the less overfished fisher – the less 
overfished fisher will become more overfished and incur additional deemed value liabilities at $13 per kg. 
Effectively the transaction produces net savings of $13 per kg – so long as the less overfished fisher remains 
in the 0 to 20 per cent overfished band. There remains a net benefit from arbitrage, albeit decreasing, all the 
way to the point where the less overfished fisher reaches 100 per cent overfished. The net savings are 
shared between the two fishers. It is the trading in ACE between overfished fishers that is referred to as 
arbitrage. An overfished fisher is not able to fully cover their overfished position through ACE acquired by 
arbitrage; the two-party trading between overfished fishers ceases to offer a net saving once both parties 
have reached the same level of overfishing. 
Data for measuring deemed values arbitrage was obtained from MPI for the fishing years 2005-06 to 2011-
12. The fishing year extends from 1 October to 30 September of the following year with fishers able to trade 
ACE from 1 October to 20 October of the following fishing year. Using the MPI data, all overfished fishers for 
all October fishstocks, were identified. All ACE trades between overfished fishers from 1 October to 20 
October were identified and recorded on a species-by-year basis. The fisher’s level of overfishing, and the 
applicable deemed value liability, was determined for the ACE balance prior to each arbitrage transaction. 
The post-arbitrage ACE-versus-catch position was then compared to the pre-arbitrage position, enabling the 
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result of the arbitrage transaction to be calculated: an increase in deemed value for the less overfished ACE 
vendor versus a decrease in deemed value for the more overfished ACE purchaser. Together, the two-party 
result gives the net saving from the arbitrage transaction. In order for ACE arbitrage to produce a saving 
there must be a variance in the level of overfishing – having both fishers at the same rate of overfishing, and 
therefore the same deemed value rate, does not allow for an overall savings in deemed value from 
arbitrage, and so no incentive to trade exists. 
In some cases a fisher may have been underfished prior to the arbitrage transaction but overfished as a 
result of it – in this case only the portion of ACE sold that put the vendor into an overfished position was 
considered to be arbitrage. Correspondingly, the amount of ACE attributed to the overfished ACE buyer was 
also limited to the portion of the ACE sold that had become ‘overfished’.  
In the first four years of the study period a service offered by Fishtech Ltd facilitated many of the arbitrage 
transactions, its stated aim being: “optimising ACE distribution to retain industry value” [1]. Fishtech was 
used by fishers as a means of finding ACE trading partners – both regular ACE trades (such as underfished to 
overfished fishers) and arbitrage trades were conducted by Fishtech. Savings from ACE arbitrage 
transactions arranged via Fishtech were shared equally between the fishers in each of the ACE trades, less a 
small commission paid to Fishtech.  
Fishtech transactions often involved the pooling of ACE where ACE for a fishstock was acquired from 
multiple fishers and then sold to one, or a smaller number, of fishers (and vice versa). In the analysis of 
deemed value saving, Fishtech transactions involving ACE acquired from underfished fishers were netted-
out from pooled arbitrage transactions. Where ACE sold in a transaction with Fishtech was partly 
underfished and partly overfished an adjustment was made so that only the overfished portion was counted 
as arbitrage. All Fishtech transactions were arranged to take place in last three days available for end-of-
year ACE balancing (i.e. 13-15 October). All direct two-party fisher-to-fisher trades between overfished 
fishers, facilitated by Fishtech as intermediary, have also been included in the measurement of arbitrage 
activity and savings.  
Fishtech was the only ACE market intermediary set up to assist fishers engage in ACE trading – both the 
typical, underfished to overfished, and the overfished to overfished arbitrage ACE trades. Fishtech 
discontinued its operations after the 2009 fishing year; it had been in operation from 2003. 
 
3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Over the seven year study period, fishers have achieved around 1.766 million dollars of savings in deemed 
value obligations through arbitrage arrangements with other fishers. The number of transactions has 
declined over the study period, from around 200 trades in the 2005-06 fishing year to only 23 in 2011-12. 
While the overall magnitude of savings declined steeply from the beginning of the study period, an upturn 
occurred in the final fishing year (2011-12) due to arbitrage activity in one key fishstock – LIN7. The pattern 
of decline in arbitrage activity (and deemed value mitigation) is matched by a decline in the overall level of 
annual deemed value liabilities invoiced by the Ministry. Apart from unusually large arbitrage transactions 
for LIN7 in the 2011-12 fishing year, the level of arbitrage saving as a percentage of annual deemed value 
invoice total has also declined (see Table 3.1)  
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TABLE 3.1 DEEMED VALUE SAVINGS BY FISHSTOCK AND YEAR 
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The discontinuation of the arbitrageur Fishtech coincided with a drop in the number of arbitrage trades. 
According to the manager of Fishtech, it was evident that demand for the service was declining, as is borne 
out by the decline in overall number arbitrage trades from 2006 to 2009 – a period when Fishtech was 
operating. Therefore, discontinuation of the service in 2009, while no doubt contributing to the fall in 
arbitrage activity, does not fully account for the decline in the number of trades. In assessing all deemed 
value saving by arbitrage it was found that Fishtech facilitated about one third of the savings – the 
remainder being direct fisher-to-fisher trades. It is also noteworthy that the majority of Fishtech facilitated 
trades were non-arbitrage trades.  
In a small number of fishstocks, the transactions between overfished fishers resulted in an overall negative 
saving outcome. These cases have been separated from the positive saving outcomes and are shown at the 
base of Table 3.1. In some instances the negative-sum trades were between a Licensed Fish Receiver (LFR) 
and a fisher (such as for KAH8). In these cases the LFR sold ACE to their overfished fisher-supplier even 
though the LFR was also in an ACE-deficit position, the likely motivation being to maintain and support the 
fisher-LFR trading relationship. 
 In the case of TAR2 (2009-10) a single ACE trade resulted in a net increase in deemed value liability (i.e. 
negative saving) of $34,256.53. Discussion with industry sources indicated that fishers may at times receive 
ACE in advance of payment, effectively having ACE on loan until payment is made at an agreed future date. 
Such an arrangement was in place in the case of TAR2 but non-payment by the fisher resulted in the ACE 
being repossessed – the ACE market agent, acting for the ACE vendor, reversed the ACE trade and thereby 
put the overfished fisher into a significantly more overfished position and thus increasing the fisher’s 
deemed value owed. The case of GUR2 (2009-10) involved the very same fisher-agent scenario and resulted 
in forfeiture of GUR2 ACE and an increase in deemed value. 
In reporting deemed value saving it was decided to focus on arbitrage trading that produced a positive-sum 
result. The few instances of ACE trades between overfished fishers that resulted in negative-sum trades 
were not conducted for the purpose of arbitrage (i.e. deemed value mitigation) and thus would give 
misleading results if included. This is especially so in the case of TAR2, where if the forfeiture-trade were 
included, it would overwhelm the positive savings from arbitrage trades for the all-fishstock total for the 
2009-10 fishing year. 
It is apparent from the data showing all overfished fishers, that only a very small percentage of overfished 
fishers engaged in arbitrage transactions, and consequently, it is likely that a sizable amount of untapped 
arbitrage related deemed value saving exists. Measurement of this would be possible from the existing data 
but this analysis was outside of the scope of this study; it may warrant further investigation. 
The results presented in Table 3.1 indicate that arbitrage does not take place on a regular, year-by-year 
basis for the majority of fishstocks. This suggests that arbitrage is not systematic or premeditated to support 
overfishing but rather it is a relatively infrequent cost-reducing action, carried out after normal catch 
balancing efforts have failed. Interestingly, SNA1, which is problematic for fishers seeking ACE for balancing, 
does not feature strongly in the arbitrage results. 
Arbitrage activity does however occur with some year-to-year consistency for certain fishstocks. Two 
examples of fishstocks that stand out as consistent subjects for arbitrage are LIN7 and SPO2. The level of 
savings and the frequency of trades in LIN7 make it worthy of some further discussion. 
3.1 THE CASE OF LING 7 (LIN7) 
The Ling 7 (LIN7) fishstock exists on the West Coast of the South Island (WCSI) – an important hoki fishery. 
Ling live near the seabed but are understood to come up the water column when feeding on hoki, especially 
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during the hoki spawning season, and consequently end up as bycatch to the hoki and hake trawl fishery. 
They are also fished as target species by both trawl and longline methods. However in LIN7 they are caught 
mainly from target hoki tows. Hoki TACC’s have been increasing since 2009 (most recently in 2013 by 20,000 
tonnes to 150,000 tonnes) and as a result ling bycatch from the hoki target fishery has also increased. Ling 
TACC was increased in 2013 (to 3080 tonnes) to reflect its increased abundance (stock levels are estimated 
by MPI to be as high as 70 per cent of the biomass that would exist in the absence of fishing). The previous 
increase was in 2009 to 2474 tonnes. 
The 2010 NIWA study by Sira L. Ballara et al. [2] shows that ling, on average (for fishing years October 2000 
to September 2007) accounted for about 2.3 per cent of the combined hoki, hake and ling trawl catch in the 
WCSI hoki, hake and ling fishery. This suggests that on average ling make up a 2.3 per cent bycatch per trawl 
tow. Clearly, cessation of fishing because a fisher’s ling ACE was fully fished would come at a considerable 
financial cost in terms of hoki and hake catch and revenue foregone – assuming their hoki and hake ACE was 
not fully fished. This situation helps explain why LIN7 was fished to 111.49 per cent of ACE in 2011-12. 
The relative size of the hoki versus ling fishery suggests that although the cost of incurring deemed value 
charges on excess ling bycatch is substantial (the highest by far of any fishstock in 2012 at over $1.05 million 
for LIN7) the return to the hoki catch would still be financially viable. The export revenue from processed 
hoki is around $170 million. One of the principal arbitrageurs in the LIN7 fishery is also the single largest 
quota holders of hoki with a 30 per cent holding. The financial position suggests that fishers have some 
tolerance for incurring deemed value charges. And fisher knowledge that the ling stock is not under any 
threat of depletion – an important consideration from a sustainable resource stewardship perspective – may 
contribute to the tendency for some overfishing.  
Nevertheless, there is always an incentive to reduce costs whenever possible. The fishing entities associated 
with LIN7 arbitrage in 2011-12 were able to mitigate their overall deemed value liability by around $350,000 
– a substantial percentage reduction of about 33 per cent. The majority of fishers engaged in the arbitrage 
for this fishstock are closely aligned in the WCSI hoki fishery, a situation conducive to arbitrage 
arrangements for the bycatch stock ling.  
3.2 ACE PRICE AND DEEMED VALUE RELATIONSHIP 
Another area for consideration is the impact that ACE shortfalls, and the consequent deemed value rates 
that impact on fishers have on ACE price. In overfished fishstocks that have high deemed value rates relative 
to the landed (port) price, fisher competition for unfished ACE would likely see escalating ACE prices. 
However, the limited ACE trade price information that is publically available does not give evidence of a 
sharp upturn in ACE price at the critical end of year catch balancing window. Of all the fishstocks with 
recorded data on ACE trade price for 2011-12 only three stocks (JDO7, KAH8 and LIN1) show signs that end-
of-year competition might have forced a rise in ACE price (see Appendix C). 
The evidence of price competition for these stocks was determined by comparing the 2012 year-to-date 
highs for ACE price for the month ended August with those for the month ended September. JDO7 ACE price 
high went from $2702.2 to $2993.3 per tonne, KAH8 from $500 to $600 per tonne and LIN1 from $2000 to 
$2100 per tonne. While none of these fishstocks were subject to arbitrage trades in the fishing year selected 
they were all over 90 per cent fished suggesting tight ACE markets. However, discussions with industry 
stakeholders suggest that yearly arrangement for ACE trades are more likely to be rollovers of on-going 
arrangements based on long-standing relationships. In these situations prices are formed through 
negotiations that take place between the trading parties, rather than in an auction market scenario open to, 
potentially frantic, multi-party bidding. 
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Notwithstanding the above, some evidence of a deemed value to ACE price relationship are observed. The 
ACE transfer prices recorded in the publicly accessible FishServe database are unreliable, with often only a 
nominal amount being reported by fishers, and in many instances no entry at all. Bearing this limitation in 
mind, the figures recorded in the ACE transfer price records show wide variances between the low and high 
price per tonne paid in ACE trades. Often the high price can be two or three times the low price for the year. 
In the case of LIN7, 2012 saw a considerably higher year-end 30 Sep 2012 average ACE per tonne price 
($1810.50) than that for LIN1 ($1061.40) LIN2 ($789.70) LIN3 ($819.70) and LIN5 ($1191.50) fishstocks – 
clear evidence of the of the importance of having LIN7 ACE for balancing this bycatch to the WCSI hoki 
fishery, and the shortage of LIN7 ACE. LIN5 was also close to overfished and subject to ACE arbitrage in 
2012. It has the second highest average price per tonne, and the second highest high-price, giving further 
evidence suggesting ACE market excess demand and deemed value differentials are driving up ACE price. 
LIN7 ACE price average in October 2012 was $2298 (up from $1810.50 the previous month and $1999.50 in 
October 2011). The bycatch and consequent ACE balancing issues experienced in LIN7 are in fact impacting 
on ACE demand and price. The fact that ling is predominantly an export fish also suggests that it is not 
variances in local market demand for the fish that is influencing ACE price but rather the dynamics on the 
supply side, particularly ling being a bycatch to the large volume hoki catch.  
In an attempt to establish whether fishers in the arbitrage related fishstocks may have opted to pay deemed 
value rather than buy ACE, a comparison was made of deemed value rates to port price for fish and ACE 
price. If ACE price is higher than the deemed value rate, fishers without ACE may simply pay deemed value, 
and in the process save money. Given that deemed value arbitrage is an end of year activity, it was decided 
to compare the lowest level of deemed value with the highest ACE price for the year. The rationale being 
that an overfished fisher would face the higher ACE price at year-end for any ACE still on the market. The 
results from this comparison show that in some fishstock a fisher would have an incentive to pay deemed 
value rather than buy ACE for at least the first threshold of overfishing (see Appendix C - grey shading). 
When comparing the highest deemed value rate to the highest ACE price the situation is quite different. In 
all arbitrage related fishstocks the highest deemed value rate is substantially higher than the highest ACE 
price. This suggests that while a fisher may have a financial incentive to remain overfished by a small 
percentage (say by 10 per cent) rather than pay for ACE there is a substantial disincentive to engage in 
significant (say 100 per cent) overfishing rather than buy ACE. It is important to note, however, that in the 
majority of the arbitrage related fishstocks, overall industry catch versus ACE is greater than 100 per cent 
meaning that there is unlikely to be any ACE to buy, making arbitrage the only possible option for an 
overfished fisher seeking some relief from deemed value obligations.  
The other variable in assessing fisher incentives to overfish is the price received for the landed fish (port 
price). This analysis is somewhat inconclusive due to the absence of reliable price data for fishstocks – port 
price received is generally believed as being understated by fishers; see for example Stewart and Callagher 
2013 [3]. There will also be variances in return to fishers for fish caught resulting from the nature of their 
operation, such as supplying to a LFR versus a vertically integrated firm processing and exporting its own 
catch. Clearly in certain fisheries, such as ling and rig, the returns from the target species are sufficient to 
absorb the deemed value penalty from at least some level of overfishing of the bycatch. 
Appendix C (which is limited to fishstocks that were subject to arbitrage activity) shows that for most 
fishstocks port price exceeds the lowest deemed value rate, meaning that at low levels of overfishing fishers 
are at least able to cover the deemed value incurred with the port price received; a satisfactory situation if 
overfishing was in a bycatch. The situation is quite different for high levels of overfishing, incurring the 
highest deemed value rate; here the port price for the great majority of fishstocks is below the deemed 
value rate, making overfishing costly. It is in these cases that arbitrage may be a worthwhile strategy. 
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3.3 POLICY ADJUSTMENTS  
The regular review of sustainability measures and management controls for fishstocks conducted by the 
Ministry for Primary Industries (the ‘Ministry’), aims at setting deemed values and TACC at levels that ensure 
fishers have strong incentives to balance catch with ACE. To achieve this aim regular adjustments are made, 
as considered appropriate, to deemed value and TACC for fishstocks. For example HO454 Notice of Decisions 
[4] the Ministry made adjustments to TACC levels and deemed value rates to a number of fishstocks 
(including some that were subject to arbitrage) so as to better align fisher incentives with the sustainability 
goals of fisheries management. It is expected that these, and similar adjustments, have contributed to the 
declining trend in deemed value invoicing (i.e. overfishing) and may have directly contributed to the decline 
in arbitrage activity. It is also believed that fishers have refined their own catch management strategies, 
such as dynamic catch- plan adjustment, to avoid or at least mitigate overfishing. 
However, in such a dynamic operating environment (such as variance in fisher effort, and uncertainty of 
stock size through variance factors such as fishstock recruitment levels) it is unlikely that fine-tuning of TACC 
and deemed value rates could eliminate overfishing.  
A case that illustrates this is the SPO2 (Rig) fishery which is a bycatch to a number of target fisheries 
(tarakihi, red gurnard, flatfish, blue warehou and blue moki). In their Rig 2 (SPO): Final Advice Paper [5] the 
(then) Ministry of Fisheries recommended that SPO2 TACC be increased from 86 to 108 tonnes, effective 
from the 2011-12 fishing year so as to enable fishers to maximise value in SPO2 and associated target 
fisheries and reduce their deemed value payments. This adjustment, while no doubt helping, did not 
eliminate overfishing with deemed value invoiced at $51,545 for the 2011-12 fishing year and the related 
arbitrage activity leading to deemed value saving of $1,784.60. 
 
4 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
ACE market arbitrage plays a role in reallocating ACE to fishers who are most highly overcaught. It has the 
effect of reducing the deemed value rate on a portion of the overfished catch but cannot, by definition of 
arbitrage, eliminate all deemed value incurred from overfishing. In reducing the cost of overfishing it may 
contribute to a higher level of overfishing of a fishstock than would otherwise be tolerated by fishers.  
The practice of arbitrage does not appear to be widespread, and is declining. In recent fishing years, 
arbitrage saving is substantial in only a small number of fishstocks, most notably the bycatch stock LIN7. 
Over the seven year study period total deemed value saving through arbitrage trading in ACE amounted to 
about 6 per cent of the total deemed value invoiced for the arbitrage related fishstocks. 
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APPENDIX A – ISSUES AND SUGGESTIONS (UNEDITED) – OVERALL FISHERY  
Fisher Issues Suggestions 
F1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Availability or finding available ACE. Many ACE holders 
sit on ACE in case they may need it later, then at the end 
of the year when you havnt much hope of catching it 
before year end they put it up for lease.   I have also seen 
examples of where a species is in big demand to cover 
by-catch, of people sitting on ACE to lease it out at year 
end for more than the catch value to cover people with 
massive over-catch deemed value bills. With species like 
ELE5 it is easy to be over 200% overfished if you have a 
small ACE holding and looking at a deemed bill of 3 times 
the catch fee so you are better to lease for 200% of the 
fishes value then pay a 300% deemed bill. The only other 
option is to dump that species which is illegal. This may 
be good business for quota owners but does nothing for 
stocks and fishers. 
 
As it is private property you cant force people to make it 
available but with the companies that allocate ACE to 
fishers they should have a system where if you havnt met 
certain catch targets throughout the year without a good 
reason you should surrender what you are behind. If you 
dont and it doesnt get caught then you should be 
responsible for the ACE fee.  With species like ELE5 it 
should be issued as a by-catch species and targeting 
only okayed when by-catch requirements are met. Quota 
increases dont help those who have low ACE holdings of 
a species, as one fisher I know said when you have 
bugger all ACE a 20% increase of bugger all is bugger 
all.  
 
 
 
F2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cost of ACE compared to port price  Ramped deemed 
value and stock abundance in some fishstocks keep 
pushing up ACE prices (we tender prices that are 
unconditional at times just to try and get ACE to cover 
bycatch and still don't have the winning tender.  Fishstock 
TACCs need to work together, e.g. huge FLA7 TACC 
means more boats fishing in that area than there is 
available bycatch of SNA7 to cover  ACE has become an 
investment for people outside of the industry and they 
want best return for their investment. I can understand 
this, but we are heading towards a situation where there 
won't be any boats to catch the fish because no one can 
afford to invest in new boats. 
 
 
Stop bowing to political pressure when science proves 
otherwise. TACC should be set irrespective of what 
Greens, recreational fishers and big companies think and 
be solely based on state of fishery (up or down) so the 
fishery can be utilised to its full potential without putting 
any fishstock at risk.  Possible bycatch trade-offs for 
"genuine bycatch" for some species?  In season 
increase/decrease at appropriate time. MPI needs to be 
able to make faster decisions.  Possible "surrender" of 
some species so we can fish where the main 
concentrations of target species are without deem value 
of by-catch making it uneconomical.  Our FLA7 and 
GUR7 catch is very down on what it could be because 
there is now too much SNA7 in our traditional fishing 
areas and we can go there.  Thank you. Good luck. x 
F3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Large fishing companies have the monopoly. Foreign 
charter vessels will outbid any small company on price as 
they can make a 400%+ profit on selling our fish 
overseas.  ACE market allows a lot of cowboys to 
operate, not having any allocated ACE to go fishing but 
being able to sell their fish privately at market to cover 
deem value.  Maori owned companies only operating 
foreign charters. 
 
Maori should have to offer their inshore ACE to New 
Zealanders first before being allowed to give it to foreign 
vessels.  Large foreign vessels operating in the JMA 
Fisheries should only get the last choice on any valuable 
inshore bycatch species, as they can afford to pay huge 
deem values, even though they won’t like the idea.  Bring 
back bycatch tradeoff. 
 
 
F4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It has draconian punitive laws.  Confiscation of quota 
fishing vessels and jail terms.  And with the small 
amounts of ACE available and ramped deem values there 
is no other option for fishers in an industry that has fishers 
with alot of experience leaving in droves with no one 
replacing them and a fishing fleet that is ageing and no 
owner operators being able to afford to replace their 
vessels.  I think the limited SNA ACE and abundant 
stocks is a perfect storm of mismanagement.  I rack my 
brain to try and think of something that could make it 
worse than it already is and I can't think of anything.  
Lease prices higher than the fish price, ramped deem 
values and extremely tough punishment for non-
compliance to protect a fish stock that is hard to 
comprehend  its true size.   In Europe the cods stock are 
recovering well, so when fishermen catch their quota they 
have to dump dead fish back into the sea.  This drives the 
European fishermen nuts - no fishermen goes to sea to 
dump fish.  But in NZ we have an even sillier system.  
Fishermen have to pack and process and ice fish, time 
consuming and hard work and then pay to land it!!!!  
Options for fishermen with deemed values higher than 
you get paid for the fish and are ramped up from there.  1   
Pay to land snapper - go broke  2   Tie boat up when 
snapper ACE is caught - go broke  3   Dump fish - lose 
everything - go to jail  These are the options available to 
NZ fishermen who are very hard working people in the 
most dangerous job in the country.  People who are 
This is easy to fix - Double snapper ACE, scrap ramped 
deem values, set deem values at port prices, apply the 
aggregation clause in the original quota system, so 
fishermen without ACE can source it and major fishing 
entities don't get all the ACE. Also in the original format 
of the quota areas there was an area 8 snapper that 
stopped at Tirua point which is between Awakino and 
Kawhia and the area above that was Area 9 snapper.  
Alot of the ACE that was caught on Nelson/Wanganui 
and New Plymouth trawlers were all caught south of 
Tirua Point, alot of this quota has since been sold on to 
fishers in the northern part of Area 8, so there is very little 
ACE available in Taranaki.  So reintroducing an Area 8 
and Area 9 snapper would help reduce the huge 
amounts of snapper in the southern end of Area 8 
snapper.  Is this going to happen?    Yeh right!    Benefits 
of this happening - increased GDP, increased local 
economy, particularly small coastal areas around NZ, 
increase in jobs, increase in taxes, increase in ACC 
levies, and if the Govt held the ACE increase in lease 
levies for them and you would actually get an increase in 
deemed payments because fishermen could land the fish 
and not lose money.    Some of the detail supplied in this 
survey may not be entirely accurate because I havn't had 
the time to research this information fully but I promise 
you the figures are not far off the mark.    I find the ACE 
system frustrating which is probaly evident from what I 
have written and makes my job as a fishermen extremely 
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passionate about what they do, create alot of 
employment, pay taxes and stimulate our economy.  This 
is just ridiculous!!!    A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 
SNAPPER FISHERY AROUND NZ  1950-1960  Small NZ 
trawlers with low horse power catching small amounts of 
snapper with a 3 nautical mile territorial limit.  Large 
Japanese mother ships with small dories setting mile 
upon mile of long line for snapper.    1960-1970  Huge 
Japanese trawlers fishing around NZ raping our snapper 
stocks.  The biggest trawler in the world at the time was 
built in Japan for the purpose of coming to NZ and 
catching our snapper.    1970-1980  Pair trawling by NZ 
fishermen, this caught snapper but the biggest impact on 
the snapper stocks had already occurred by Japanese 
fishing vessels.   1986  Quota system introduced.  Based 
on NZ fishing catch only.  The most significant catches 
had already occurred by Japanese fishers and was never 
considered when snapper quota was set with a 40% 
reduction of recent NZ catch history.    2013  The 
explosion of snapper biomass in NZ is almost 
unbelievable.  After 27 years of snapper being avoided by 
fishermen around the North Island and top of the South 
Island.    When I was a young deck hand in the early 80's 
on a pair trawler fishing in an area known as the Mokau 
gap, where snapper spawned between Nov/Dec in the 
North Taranaki Bight I counted 11 trawlers all within about 
a 4nm radius of our boat.  We were all catching snapper.  
For about the last 15 years there has been no fishing 
effort in this area at this time of the year at all.  I mean 
absolutely none.  This is an area that New Plymouth, 
Wanganui, Auckland, Raglan and Nelson trawlers worked 
in the snapper schooling season.  The reason no one 
fishes this area any more is because if you towed your 
trawl gear through there now your vessel would grind to a 
halt and when you hauled back in your gear you would 
have an island of snapper behind your boat you could 
walk on.  You could easily catch 30ton of snapper in two 
hours.  I currently catch about 40ton a year.  Imagine 
what you would do if this happened?  I think I would slit 
my wrist.  What would the deemed value be?  How would 
you put that fish on your boat and who would take it? If 
one of these fish went back in the water it is a $400 fine.    
The worst thing about this is if you caught snapper like 
this your impact on the snapper stocks would still be 
insignificant.  So all these crazy rules and laws have no 
relation to the real situation regarding snapper stocks.  Its 
just madness, madness, madness.  The situation is 
absurd in the extreme and every year it is getting worse.  
The quota system in its original form had some very good 
implementations, such as a by catch trade off.  Deemed 
values set on port prices with no ramping and the 
aggregation rule preventing quota holders getting a 
monopoly on fish species.    As new fish stocks get 
introduced into the quota system the same method that 
was originally used for the first fish stocks should apply.  
A 2-3 year moratorium should be placed on a said fish 
species where fishermen must land this fish to get a stock 
assessment on that particular species (refer to KIN8 in 
Q12 on not how to do it) and then set quota from there 
and that ACE should be made available to that fisher.  In 
this scenario you would get total compliance by fishermen 
rather than what is currently occurring when new fish 
species get introduced into the quota system and 
fishermen get no entitlement.  There is nothing stopping 
this being implemented for new species entering the ACE 
system and even reallocating ACE that has already been 
set.  The problem with the ACE system is that the ACE 
holders hold all the cards and fishermen have to pay 
incredibly high prices for the right to catch fish.  The ACE 
system is another tear of cost put on our industry and for 
some reason fishermen have to bear most of the cost.  
The people in the NZ fishing industry making all the 
money are ACE holders.  ACE should simple not have 
such an artificially high value and thre needs to be some 
difficult but the main frustration I feel is not for me but for 
all kiwis in our economy when I know that our fishing 
industry could be so much more productive. In land mass 
our country is somewhere between 70th and 80th in the 
world, we have the fourth biggest territorial waters in the 
world behind Russia, Canada and USA I believe, and 
without doubt the most prolific fish stocks in the world, 
and they are simply being under-utilised.    A quick 
question - how many trawler are now domicile in Area 8?  
Answer - One, I am it.  I am the last one left.  Much rarer 
than a Mauis dolphin.    Ian Brown.  We request a 
completed copy of this survey to be sent to us because 
we are unable to get all of the text printed because we 
have used up more space than each window allows.  
Brown and Hayman Fisheries Ltd  PO Box 905,Taranaki 
Mail Centre,  New Plymouth 4340 
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way of rationalising the cost of leasing and buying ACE.  I 
think the system used in Canada keeps their equivalent of 
ACE value at a sane level. 
F5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SNA1 ACE price is driven by operators who bycatch SNA 
and need to lease ACE rather than pay deemed value. 
This price can be the full wharf price as they make their 
profit on their other species.  Quota owners then 
capitalise the value paid for 1 kg of ACE across the total 
SNA ACE. This has then overvalued the SNA quota share 
resulting in fishers paying 40% of gross sales in rental of 
access. 
 
Increase SNA1 TACC to ease supply/demand pressure 
on ACE Review SNA catch by method and purpose, i.e., 
targeted or by-catch.  Find balance in deemed value 
price, i.e., deterrent vs. by-catch tool. X 
 
 
 
F6 
 
 
 
 
Companies and Iwis holding fishers to ransom. This quota 
system is not about sustainability, Its about MONEY!! The 
quota system is a big cash cow for government. That's 
why they like deem value a money-making machine. 
 
Give all this quota back to the fishers! Why should fishers 
have to pay go to work. You cannot control pelagic fish 
moving in and out the zone. The NZ quota system is 
breach as the best in the world. Have overseas scientists 
ever ask the fishers themselves. It's a big joke!! 
F7 
 
 
 
1, Too much of the quota is owned by people not involved 
in fishing.  2,TACC levels set too low   3, Deem values set 
too high 
 
1, Ideally all quota should be owned only by people 
actively involved in the fishing industry  2, Meaningful 
surveys done especially on SNA8 
 
F8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
That companies that control the catch species control the 
target stock.  That companies that control ACE large trade 
early enough and wait large D/V is reached and increase 
sale price.   Fishers are very targeting to scaled D/V 
 
 
Remove 10% carry over and make (a) available 
sustainable fish be caught on an annual basis (b) make 
major ACE holders trade more fairly. ( although this 
would penalise my position as an ACE fisher)     revisit 
D/V it is grossly unfair to by catch  species that costs 
more than your target species catch on a daily or by 
voyage basis.  There must be a better way to stop 
companies targeting without ACE = the bycatch is the 
issue 
F9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The operation of the ACE Market generally works well.     
The availability of ACE in an improving fishery is 
frustrating, the system does not react to an increasing 
resource, several years of increasing abundance, over 
catch only means you pay more deem value, and does 
not often result in the fish stock TAC being adjusted, or 
any adjustment is so conservative it is of no use - the lost 
economic value is huge.    They are quick to cut TAC but 
slow to increase - both an significant impacts on the 
economic benefits that flow to the NZ Economy.    A major 
problem with the price of ACE - it is often linked closely to 
the Deem Value rate and bears no relation to the landed 
price received for the fish caught.  The Deem Value 
System assumes a fisher can reasonably avoid catching 
the unwanted species - this is incorrect - at least in a multi 
species fishery as in East Coast South Island.  When the 
ACE market price is essentially linked to the DV price the 
price of ACE becomes highly skewed.  Fishers are 
required to land the fish and pay the Deem Value - yet the 
LFR / Wholesaler and Retailer only pay the base price / 
market price for the fish.  Unless part of a Vertically 
Integrated Fishing Company, the fisher is usually a price 
taker not a price setter - the higher level players / 
participants all have the opportunity to make a profit from 
the fish that the Fisher only pays the DV Penalty on.   This 
system is unfair and adversely affects the price of ACE to 
the fisher.    Supply and Demand is a fair system for the 
pricing of ACE, but when the Deem Value system has 
undue influence on the fairness of the system it is wrong. 
 
 
If Deem Value was somehow able to be apportioned to 
participants throughout the value chain it would be fairer.    
If TAC was more responsive to an increasing fishery the 
ACE market would be more efficient and correct. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F10 
 
 
 
 
 
A number of TACC's are not set at the correct levels to 
reflect the current ( improved for a number of years) catch 
levels  A lot of deemed values are set too high.  
Differential deemed values on fishstocks that are healthy 
and with incorrect TACC’s.   The lack of ACE availability 
on a good number of bycatch stocks stop us from 
Clearly there are certain TACC's that need to be adjusted 
/ increased (i.e. SNA8, KIN8). The Quota management 
system cannot operate justifiably with fishing areas 
completely distorted the way they are presently 
operating. The reality is that there are now a lot of fish 
stocks that should be increased due to solid 
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catching all possible ACE for certain target species hence 
distorting the whole picture 
 
improvement in CPE and very efficient management 
procedures. 
 
 
F11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lease prices do not reflect the value of the fish but follow 
the unrealistic deemed value process which has nothing 
to do with fish pricing 
 
 
 
 
SNA8 needs at least a 50percent increase in tac  
kin8could easily be doubled   we throw back all our live 
kin and sna  tar 8 ace is like rocking horse shit   all 
available ace caught in 3 tows  pressure is coming on 
area8species as we cant fish inshore anymore because 
the minister and his toadies have been captured by the 
greenies and stopped inshore set netting .we had a 
balanced package and now risk bankruptcy by fishing 
deeper waters that we struggle to get ace for  and have 
to tender higher than economic prices to secure ace 
while our ace prices are less as no one can target those 
shallow species ie spo8 
 
F12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TAC's far to low SNA8 and KIN8. Differential Deemed 
Values for SNA8 & KIN8 are far to high. These high 
values allow the ACE owners to dictate the market price. 
At present I clear 50c per kilo SNA8 after paying $6/ kilo 
ACS rental. 
 
 
Eliminate Differential and set a realistic Deemed Value 
which would reduce the exorbitant ACE rentals currently 
charged. This would allow us to continue landing SNA & 
KIN as by catch to WAR, SPO, SCH and GUR rather 
than shifting from lucrative target species grounds due to 
over-abundance of SNA and KIN. 
 
F13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1/ not enough quota shares available 2/ astronomical 
deemed value $ for particular specie that fisher is liable 
for.  3/ having to land certain species of small fish with no 
commercial value because there is no size limit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1/ increase in quota shares where warranted , and 
backed by a healthy stock  2/ nobody gains financially or 
is penalised financially. if fish is caught and ace not found 
the the fish is landed and processed and given to the 
hospices and hospitals for food at the cost to the 
processor to fillet only, example cost $2.00 per kilo.  
3/put a size limit on all specie, 11 inshore species do 
already have size limits. the main issue for me as an 
inshore trawlerman is gurnard, it has no size limit and if 
we discard it with fish that do have size limits(ie fla) we 
are so called dumpers and high graders and are liable for 
extreme fines and boat seizure, put a size on all species 
and stop mucking us around so we can do our jobs in 
these increasingly challenging financial times 
 
F14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not enough ACE is available on the open market as 
individual species. Most of the ACE is tendered as 
packages. This suits Processing companys much better 
than individual fishers. The Tendering process is also 
often corrupt. It is only used to establish a market value 
for the ACE, which is then sold to a preferential 
purchaser. 
 
Not sure how to do this, without an overhaul of the ITQ 
system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The wrong people own it. Needs to be only harvesters 
who should own quota  the price is too high. Tthe Maori 
owned quota mostly is traded in parcels and fishers have 
no way of tendering for their needs as only the large 
company's have means of acquiring the large mixed 
parcels and trading there unneeded ACE amongst other 
companies.  The choke stocks that control our ability to 
catch available bycatch and the price these choke stocks 
trade at .the tail wags the dog. When seasonal 
abundances occur there is too slow a mechanisim to 
ddress the new abundance to make it available to be 
fished. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cost recovery should only be levied against caught quota 
.  as it is now we are levied against quota that is not even 
available in our territorial waters.  the uncaught quota in 
the system which is cost recovered is causing the overall 
price of the caught quota ace price to be higher than it 
should be for ace owners to recover their losses  the 
crown buying all quota back and starting again with a 
new ownership model so as the super profits go back to 
the harvesters so as we can modernize our old decrepit 
fleet that was largely built by the Muldoon government in 
the 70s.the old men and old vessels are nearly finished 
and there is no way with the present structure that there 
is any future for especially the inshore fishery into the  
future.  the QMS  system is supposedly the best in the 
world for managing fishery's but 28 years on it would 
seem it managed the stocks but made fishermen the 
endangered species 
 
 
 
F16 
 
 
 
 
The people with the money have top priority so is hard for 
new skippers to go and buy own boats and get ACE.  
Large companies have the majority share which does not 
allow small time boat owners to lease  ACE. To buy or 
lease ACE in some fisheries is too high risk as lease 
Prevent fishing companies from buying any more quota. 
This would allow the fisherman more control of their own 
livelihoods. They are the ones that catch it and are at the 
mercy of large greedy companies who make a great deal 
of money by paying the fisherman a very small 
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prices are ridiculously high due to companies who have 
the financial capital to pay more for it and buy many 
tonne. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
percentage of what they get paid. The only ones who 
make money out of fishing are those who own quota. 
There are very few skippers under the age of 40 (unless 
their family owns quota) because they cannot make a 
decent living out of it. The industry will be in trouble over 
the next 20 years as there will be fewer and fewer 
skippers. I would like to see the statistics on how many 
people are sitting their tickets. Having conversations with 
fisherman about what is happening at the coalface needs 
to be done. Finding out what is really going on and what 
is happening is imperative to resolve the issues 
F17 
 
 
 
 
The big boys hold all the quota on most stocks which they 
have been leasing out now since1986  or so. Most HAVE 
INCREASED THE LEASE over the past few years.   
people hold ace and have never been involved in the 
fishing industry 
No company or individual should  be allowed to own 
more than 10% of any ace  you must be engaged full 
time in fishing and earn no less than 95% of your total  
income for that year from fishing.  ace is to protect our 
fish stocks, not a trading commodity 
F18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SNA8 is driving fishers from the industry as there is no 
ace available to lease . we are catching sna in places 
where we would not get them in the past so the fishery is 
very healthy . the price of any available ace usually 
exceeds the port price and the lease price is driven by an 
excessive deem value 
 
The easiest management tool is one that worked well in 
the past. a return to bycatch trade off and an increase in 
sna 8 tacc would be of enormous benefit to fishers 
 
 
 
 
F19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate *##* who see ACE as theirs to manipulate the 
desperate fishers who are dependent on ACE to feed 
their family.  Large quota owners are a disgrace to the 
inshore fishers. It is in a state of crisis due to the fishers 
not being paid enough to upgrade - progress - keep up 
with change and maintenance on vessels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Short of not allowing large corporates being *##* ! Any 
oxymoron!  Bottom line is if the quota owners want  their 
ACE caught they have to get good fishermen, they want 
to screw fishers as quota owners want more and more 
for their valuable quota parcel. I see a collapse of the 
fishing industry will be the only way to see the fishers 
paid more for their labour, the fishers left are efficient, 
they have to be.  The good quota owners and fishers will 
work together. Forget markets and together make it work.  
A shared income rather than it all being allocated to the 
processor. See diagram  Small = Fisher's share; Medium 
= Processor's share; Large = Quota owners share 
 
 
F20 
 
 
 
 
 
Significant quantities of ACE do not become available 
until the last 2 months of the year. 
 
 
 
 
Bigger companies hold on becuase of uncertainty of 
future catch. Removing the 10% underfishing rights 
would free up the market if companies knew they could 
not carry ACE forward. It is the single biggest 
impediment in the ACE market as removal would free up 
ACE for fishers who are overcaught. 
F21 Manipulation of large ace holders   
F22 
 
 
 
Expense. 
 
 
 
Return some of the tonnage taken off fishers eg SNA and 
KAH - area 1 - both stocks very plentiful - lease costs 
would then be lower for businesses. 
 
F23 
 
Avoiding catching species for which stocks have 
recovered, i.e., MOK2, HPB2, RIG2, SCH2 
Species trade-off, i.e., WAR2 for MOK2, WAR2 for RIG2, 
WAR2 for SCH2 HPB2 for SCH2 
F24 
 
Main ACE holders holding monopoly with species Unsolvable at the moment due to the way system was 
set up.x 
F25 
 
Getting ACE holders to release quota early enough before 
October. 
I think you just have to keep on to them. 
F26 
 
Incorrect TACC levels 
 
MPI needs to be more active in setting TACC levels 
correctly/annually. x 
F27 
 
 
Cost. ACE can cost more than value of fish.  Availability.  
Controlled by big corporations (large amounts) 
  
 
 
F28 
 
 
 
 
The cost and availability of SNA1 
 
 
 
 
Increase TACC  Improve fishing practices to minimise 
undersize and poor quality SNA  Installation of VMS to 
help MPI catch offenders who may be dumping fish they 
don't have ACE for. 
 
F29 
 
  leave it to the company! 
 
F30 
 
 
 
 
Big Company and Block holdings command the 
availability 
 
 
 
Small operators should have ability to source modest 
amounts of Quota in their area, instead of Large 
Company's dictating availability . i.e. Local iwi should 
have some say in how Quota is apportioned instead of 
the Administrators of a Block Holding hunting the highest 
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dollar regardless of the cost in jobs and revenue to the 
coastal community it is sourced from. 
F31 
 
 
SNA1 ace is some times more expensive than the price of 
the fish 
 
Price needs to be cheaper 
 
 
F32 
 
 
some ace prices are far to high if the ace owners keep 
demanding high prices for ace more fisherman will be 
selling up leaving no one to catch there ace 
fisherman should agree on fixed ace prices for all  areas 
it would stop some trucking of fish 
F36 Lack of available information Make Fred more accessible 
F37 
 
 
 
 
Non availability of plentyful species such as SNA , SPO , 
ELE to name but a few. 
 
 
 
Faster increases in quota when its obvious the fishery is 
in good health and can sustain an immediate increase. 
Even if only temporary subject to good interactive 
consultation with the fishers , departments etc. 
 
F40 Revise ACE on ELE3 and GUR Increase TAC on above species. Area 3. xps 
F42 
 
 
Deemed values! 
 
 
Making deemed values slightly below the port value.  Not 
over the port values which in some cases could bankrupt 
the fisher. xps 
F43 Don't have any issues with the ACE market. xps   
F45 
 
 
 
Unfair balance of ACE to the big fishing companies. 
 
 
Put a stop on the big fishing companies being able to 
own any more quota 
 
 
F46 
 
Complicated legal requirements 
 
Being less complicated so buyers can do their own 
dealings on line 
F48 
 
 
 
Large monopoly of ace owners. 
 
 
 
Shares being owned by fishers and aggregation being 
imposed, not rules changed to assist large maori and 
corporates control the work place access to ace 
F49 
 
 
The high lease prices 
 
 
Make it fair for all parties concerned.  1/3 1/3 1/3 to all 
parties ,then we get a chance to have excellent boats ,  
the fisherman takes alot of the risks , 
F50 finding it... people beening to gready ?? 
F51 High cost of ace Lower cost ace put on the market 
F53 
 
 
 
Bigger operators seem to be able to secure ACE easier 
than small operators    Some species don't seem to have 
enough quota/ACE allocated to cover healthy fish stocks. 
Quicker adjustments on available fish abundance to 
increase ACE tonnages. 
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APPENDIX B – ISSUES AND SUGGESTIONS – SNA1  
Fisher Issues Suggestions 
FSNA1 
 
 
Expense. 
 
 
Return some of the tonnage taken off fishers eg SNA 
and KAH - area 1 - both stocks very plentiful - lease 
costs would then be lower for businesses. 
FSNA2 
 
 
 
The cost and availability of SNA1 Increase TACC  Improve fishing practices to 
minimise undersize and poor quality SNA  Installation 
of VMS to help MPI catch offenders who may be 
dumping fish they don't have ACE for. 
FSNA3 
 
 
SNA1 ACE price is driven by operators who bycatch 
SNA and need to lease ACE rather than pay deemed 
value. This price can be the full wharf price as they 
make their profit on their other species.  Quota owners 
then capitalise the value paid for 1 kg of ACE across the 
total SNA ACE. This has then overvalued the SNA 
quota share resulting in fishers paying 40% of gross 
sales in rental of access. 
Increase SNA1 TACC to ease supply/demand 
pressure on ACE  Review SNA catch by method and 
purpose, i.e., targeted or by-catch.  Find balance in 
deemed value price, i.e., deterrent vs. by-catch tool.  
FSNA4 
 
If one doesn't have Quota and has to rely on ACE 
buying to cover catch, it is very difficult to operate as a 
Fisher these days. All one ends up at the end of ones 
fishing life is a worn out boat, that can't afford the 
expenses to replace or keep up to safety standards, no 
matter how much a person trys.    People that were 
given Quota in 1984 and eventually sold out for millions, 
should not of been able to have sold to the big 
Companies that now have full control over any future 
Quota and ACE.  These people were allowed to rape 
the sea, go were they like to fish and fish  as much as 
they liked. 
The one thing you have not asked for in your survey 
is fish in different Areas which makes a big 
difference.    Like fishers in Area 8 can't fish there if 
they have no SNA8, which is in abundance, and yet 
there is Trevally, John Dory, Rigfish etc; in plenty, so 
gives a false impression of the fishery.  
 
FSNA5   Leave it to the company! 
FSNA6 
 
SNA1 ace is some times more expensive than the price 
of the fish 
Price needs to be cheaper 
FSNA8 
 
Availability of stocks in holding. 
 
Provide fisherman also with information directly via 
email etc. 
FSNA9 
 
complicated fishserve site 
 
Education I will ring fishserve and ask the staff what 
to do 
FSNA10 
 
 
 
SNA1 is in high demand with LFR, Fishers and some 
wholesalers paying more for SNA1 ace than what the 
fishers are getting payed for the fish. 
Increase in the amount of ace for SNA 1 and SCH 1. 
 
 
 
FSNA11 
 
The ACE is controlled bya few people so they charge as 
much as they can get without regard for the people 
catching.  As fisherman leave the industry they are not 
being replaced as its to expensive for new people to 
enter the industry.  As fisherman leave the remaining 
fishers are given more ace to try and keep them viable , 
but the problem is the cost of catching is going up and 
the return goes down.eg ace for SNA1 is $5, market 
price of fish $7 leaves $2 for fisher,,,    20 years ago ace 
$1.50 fish price $5 to $6 return to fisher $3.50 plus. 
price of ace set to 10% of port price , that being an 
average of the prices paid for that species, e.g. tar1 
average price  $5 ace price $0.50c this is how 
Sanfords charge there fisherman within the 
company. they have lots of young fisherman coming 
through 
 
FSNA14 
 
Price expected from ACE holders vs the price fishers 
can receive for the fish 
Not really unless ACE holders drop their prices 
 
FSNA15 
 
ACE is being traded as a commodity. Therefore 
manipulating the market. Only those actively fishing 
should be able to lease ACE.  Prices for species such 
as SNA1 are at ransom levels because fishers cannot 
fish or target other species without SNA1 ACE. 
Increase the TAC of SNA1 .  Ban gill netting in SNA1 
area to protect the inshore reefs for the use of 
recreationalists.   Ban trawling of Great Exhibition 
Bay to protect the incoming SNA1 school fish from 
bulk slaughter each year at the beginning of the 
quota year. 
FSNA17 
 
 
To control/ manipulate the market the big companies 
secure the controlling species by holding the main by 
catch species e.g. Sch1 and hpb1 and ski1. Causing 
fishers to not land them this leads to poor data and poor 
science thus poor management. 
Lower the deemed values significantly to be able to 
record the changes and magnitude   . These 
changes could provide a correction factor for 
previously recorded data. 
 
FSNA18 
 
if you will be able to get the wanted ace & the cost of it   
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Processor Issues Suggestions 
PSNA1 
 
Price. Some organisers pay prices that are not good 
economically.  No. of players. Businesses using ACE 
to catch fish pay high prices because effort made to 
squeeze companies out but quota holders that trade 
need to realise that without the smaller businesses 
the ACE price they would receive would plummet so 
they need to ensure smaller businesses don't get 
priced out and still get ACE. 
Education of market economics to ACE holders and 
the ACE holders looking beyond the now for a return 
and look at big picture. X 
 
PSNA4 Its a sellers market so the pricing can be horrific! 
 
Cap the pricing but I'm not really sure that thats fair 
to those that own the ace. 
PSNA6 
Not enough sna1 available outside big companies - 
this really limits our business - without sourcing sna1 
often at inflated prices we can't have our fishermen 
catching all the other fish we need. End up paying the 
full wholesale price for a landed snapper just to 
secure the ace to go out and get it caught on the 
basis we will make money off the "by catch " which in 
reality are the target species 
Need an increase in sna1 ace availability - tacc 
increase - there is heaps of snapper there and boats 
have to avoid areas / move / stop fishing if they get a 
load of snapper without mix 
 
PSNA7 
I think the market itself is OK but that the TAC is too 
rigid and does not adjust fast enough for changes in 
the stock levels. 
 
 
 
 
A more proactive attitude towards monitoring catch 
levels V stocks so as to make more regular 
adjustments.  A current classic example is SNA7 
which has come back so strongly in the last couple of 
years that fisherman are being forced out of fishing 
due to the lack of SNA7 ace meaning they cannot 
now fish. 
 
 
Broker Issues Suggestions 
BSNA1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I see huge common demand for many stocks creating 
competitive interest in them.  Snapper stocks dictate the 
fishers plans for the year and the lack of their availability 
and high pricing means that the fishers are out there for 
the value of their by-catch, if they are able to go fishing 
at all - given the effects of the deemed value structure 
on their operations.  Lack of availability of key stocks 
drives prices up.  Several industry players will pay top 
price for Iwi ace packages at the beginning of the 
season (as a safeguard) and if these stocks are not 
caught the ace is in the market place with an 
expectation of recovering the amounts paid.  I think the 
TACC's do not accurately reflect the abundance of fish 
available and any change to them is too slow to be of 
use to the fisher out on the water. 
Closer monitoring of the situation as the fishing year 
progresses and mechanisms in place to make 
changes in an efficient way. A major overhaul of 
TACC's throughout the QMS.  At this stage, it could 
only  be identified as a Quota System, the 
management leaves us struggling.  As a broker, I am 
constantly expected to be a magician, to procure ace 
where there isn't any available.  As an industry we 
constantly hear from MPI "increase our exports", yet 
the requirements of the first link in the chain - the 
ability to cover the landed catch legally - are not 
available to us for the reasons given above.    I think 
a lot could be achieved with a QMS/Deemed Values 
working group involving key fishing operators (owner 
operators/businessmen) around a table in 
Wellington.  This would give you some solutions to 
the problems faced by industry. 
BSNA2 
 
 
 
There are no real issues just not enough ACE available 
for the main fish stocks that are caught in area. 
 
 
 
Not sure if there is a answers - an increase in the 
TACC in some cases will only help for a short while 
but  fishers will always fish to the limit available.  In 
the case of SNA8 - 28N rights still exist and if the 
TACC is increased then most of any increase will go 
to one operator who is still in the industry and they 
will still control the ACE therefor not assisting those 
that need it now to catch other fish stocks in the area.   
Maybe have a more flexible system like in season 
TACC like they do for some fish stocks - squid, red 
cod could be one answer that might work for those 
fish stocks which are fully caught each year. 
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Quota Holder Issues Suggestions 
QHSNA2 
I cannot speak outside Northland but there is an 
urgent need to bring some TACCs in line with 
long term sustainable catches. The most 
important ones to address are FLA1, GUR1, 
TRE1, and possibly JDO1 and TAR1 are worthy 
of discussion.  
 
 
Reduce TACCs on above species. This will create 
long term advantages. It will allow a rebuild by 
leaving additional breeding stock in the water in the 
"good" years. It will stop desperate fishers going to 
sea when the SNA ACE has run out looking to catch 
left over ACE in species that do not exist. It will add 
value to those stocks. It will reduce the tonnage of 
ACE that has no value and is a liability. It will give 
some credibility back to the QMS. Recreational 
fishers will support the move. The Ace in the above 
species that is unable to be sold has NO value. This 
move will restore value to the reduced ACE. Fishers 
will be able to catch it and ACE sellers will be able to 
sell it. The MPI will build goodwill because currently it 
looks as though TACCs in these species have been 
set just for revenue gathering.That is, levies are 
being collected on quota that 23 years of the QMS 
illustrates doesn't exist. 
QHSNA3 
The volume of free ACE in the market is very 
low, as most ACE is controlled by the handful of 
fish companies and IWI.   Access to ACE from 
Fish Companies and IWI always comes with 
strings attached so it is not an open market. 
 
 
 
 
Changes the law to make it compulsory that annually 
10% of all ACE has to go into a Government 
controlled ballet where it can be tendored for in the 
order of access.  So private Fishers and possible 
new entrants to the industry get to bid in the first 
round, then Large Fish Companies, IWI and the 
amatuear sector get to bid on the remaining ACE 
stocks.  This will help stablise existing fishers plus 
open up the industry to new entrants. 
QHSNA4 
The large number of stocks for which there are 
no commercial fisheries and, consequently, no 
ACE markets 
Don't introduce stocks to the QMS unless and until 
they form a commercial fishery 
 
QHSNA5 
TACC inertia.  TACC's not reflecting the stock 
available.  FLA1 might as well not be in the QMS 
as TACC has not come near to constraining 
catch (to my knowledge) anytime this century.  I 
average 50% of my FLA1 ACE unsold.    The 
imbalance between fish and ACE available for 
SNA1 is compromising the ability to target other 
species such as JDO1 and TRE1.. 
Manage for complexes of stocks.  More nimble 
response to TACC setting, especially for species like 
FLA1 which are short lived and vary greatly in stock 
size year to year.  
QHSNA7 I lease out ACE and have no issues in finding 
buyers 
  
QHSNA9 
Too few inshore fishermen and small owner 
operators qualified to fish between the 50 and 
100 k limit M 
Make it easier for inshore fishermen to gain their 
qualifications and to buy ACE 
 
QHSNA11 
Owner of SNA1 ACE only. No problem of selling 
the lease for it 
N?A 
 
Not Specified Issues Suggestions 
NSSNA1 
Excessively high lease prices for most stocks 
 
Lower deemed values those stocks and remove the 
ratcheting up of deemed values penalties 
NSSNA2 TACC SNA1 too low Increase TACC SNA1 
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APPENDIX C – THE COMPARISON OF DEEMED VALUE AND ACE PRICE  
 
Comparison of Deemed Value Rates to ACE Price for Arbitrage Fishstocks 2005-06 
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Comparison of Deemed Value Rates to ACE Price for Arbitrage Fishstocks 2006-07 
 
Comparison of Deemed Value Rates to ACE Price for Arbitrage Fishstocks 2007-08 
 
 
Comparison of Deemed Value Rates to ACE Price for Arbitrage Fishstocks 2008-09 
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Comparison of Deemed Value Rates to ACE Price for Arbitrage Fishstocks 2009-10 
 
 
Comparison of Deemed Value Rates to ACE Price for Arbitrage Fishstocks 2010-11 
 
 
Comparison of Deemed Value Rates to ACE Price for Arbitrage Fishstocks 2011-12 
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APPENDIX D – DEEMED VALUE INVOICED VERSUS DEEMED VALUE SAVINGS 
FOR ARBITRAGE FISHSTOCKS 
 
 
